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Clientelism:  factionalism in the allocation of public resources in 
Iraq after 2003 
This paper examines clientelism in Iraq as a case study of one form of corruption. Iraq is an unusual case of 
corruption, because a key feature of Iraq’s corrupt environment is an institutionalized factional political system 
based on sectarian quotas. The paper explores the many links between clientelism and political factionalism, 
discussing whether clientelism arose because of factionalism, or whether factionalism merely determines the 
ways that clientelism currently operates in Iraq. Using fieldwork data, the findings show there are two distinct 
levels of clientelism in Iraq, both of which are linked to political factions: the individual level; and the 
organizational level. First, clientelism at the individual level entails the elites of many political factions 
regarding “money politics” as a means of influence in Iraq/ Kurdistan by buying people’s affiliations and 
thereby governing people. Second, clientelism at the organisational level entails that the spoils of political office 
are shared out among the elites of the political factions in a proportionate fashion. The paper concludes that 
clientelism is a form of political rather than economic corruption; and that while there may be some immediate 
value in clientelism, its long-term harm outweighs its short-term value. 
Key words: clientelism, oil-rents, corruption, Iraq and sectarianism.  
Introduction:   
 Despite the pervasiveness of clientelism in Iraq for centuries, from feudalism to Ba’athist 
party rule and the current post -2003 sectarian government, there has been no published study 
of clientelism in Iraq. Yet clientelism has had, and continues to have, a significant effect on 
Iraq’s economic and political system.  For example, it has discouraged the government from 
providing public goods based on merit and capacity through fair competition; it has increased 
inequality in accessing state resources; and it has enabled rulers to stay in power by allowing 
them to stage elections in which competition is stifled (Stokes, 2007; Hicken, 2011; Hilgers, 
2012). It is argued that despite the establishment of the new Iraqi government after 2003 
ending one-party rule that had prevailed for over 50 years, clientelism has persisted along 
sectarian and party lines directing public funds for the benefit of particular  groups.   
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In this paper, I will consider, first, what can be accounted as clientelism in Iraq, and due to 
the lack of consensus on the term, I will define it and justify why such a definition is 
appropriate to Iraq. I have identified five important features attributable to clientelism - 
diffuseness, longevity, obligatory, collective/dyadic, and reciprocity. Second, using data from 
fieldwork, the paper will construct a typology of the patterns of clientelistic ties found in Iraq 
that focuses on the new form of Iraqi government and its allocation of state resources. This 
typology divides clientelism into two levels: the individual and the organisational. The paper 
will conclude that clientelism is a political rather than an economic form of corruption, and 
that although clientelism in Iraq is fundamentally harmful in the long term, there may be 
some short-term value in it.    
The context of clientelism in Iraq   
"Clientelism cannot be meaningfully considered apart from the setting in which it 
exists. The forms which it takes depend to a considerable extent on the structure of 
the society and on the political system in which it operates” (Lemarchand and 
Legg, 1972:156) 
What can be accounted as clientelism in Iraq? Clientelism has always existed in Iraq in one 
form or another. Political transformations such as the replacement of the Baath party in 2003 
as a result of the US-led invasion, did not end clientelism, but only changed its form. During 
the previous 40 years, the Baath party as an engine of power had built a strong centralised 
patronage system over its population, controlled by a restricted inner circle of Saddam’s close 
associates (Tripp, 2001). Iraqis assumed in 2003 that elections and the new leaders in the 
government would bring about democracy; civil society would be autonomous; and political 
activities would be free and open for all. But the kind of democracy and elections that 
emerged did not lead to the death of clientelism, but to a new form of clientelism based on 
sectarian and partisan lines –muhassasa – which has operated in a wider manner than the 
centralised patronage system did during the time of Saddam.  
The question arises as to whether or not this new form of clientelism in Iraq requires us to 
change our definition of clientelism. The concept of clientelism has been used universally by 
many scholars, but it is hard to find a single definition to fit all contexts. While there is 
agreement on a broad generalisation that clientelism is an exchange relationship for obtaining 
political support, entailing  selective access to resources for those within the bargaining 
system and the exclusion of others from that access – i.e. it is a quid pro quo between groups 
or individuals of unequal political and economic standing - the type of inequality of the 
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partners may vary from context to context depending on the extent to which the political 
system is democratised and the resources are widely distributed. Many scholars have focused 
on the particular contexts of clientelism: for example, (see: Eisenstadt and Lemarchand 1981; 
Grzymala-Busse 2008; Hicken 2011; and Hilgers 2012). It seems that scholars are no longer 
interested in debating broader definitions of clientelism, preferring to leave the task of 
definition to local contexts because of the difficulty of arriving at a single precise definition.   
Nevertheless, although there may be a lack of agreement on the precise definition of 
clientelism (beyond that of saying that it is an exchange relationship for obtaining political 
support), there may be agreement on the features by which the clientelism relationship can be 
identified and distinguished from other social ties. I have suggested five such features- 
diffuseness; longevity; obligatoriness; collective/dyadic; and reciprocity (Muno, 2010; 
Hicken, 2011). The next five subsections, will illustrate how these five characteristics can be 
found in Iraq.    
 Diffuseness   
Much of the literature contends that clientelism focuses on single material transactions, such 
as offering jobs or material rewards including land, in exchange for votes (Vicente and 
Wantchekon, 2009; Hilgers, 2012). However, the relationship between citizens and political 
parties may cover a wider range of exchanges than single transactions, including land, jobs, 
houses, and protection, in return for which clients’ express loyalty and support as well as 
promising votes for the provider. Some scholars have described these wider ranges as a 
diffuse feature of clientelism ties. According to Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980: 49), 
clientelism is often described as diffuse in nature, because different kinds of resources and 
promises have characterised it. The relationship covers a wide range of potential exchanges, 
and so diffuseness is one of the distinct qualities of the relationship between patrons and 
clients (Scott, 1972: 95). In post-2003 Iraq, this has been evident in the sectarian and partisan 
governmental system based on muhassasa. Through this system, party affiliations have 
replaced entitlement based on merit. The parties’ capacity to use public funds for clientelistic 
purposes depends on the extent to which state funds are allocated according to muhasassa 
and partisan logic. The allocation of public funds does not come from citizens’ taxation but 
from oil rents. The resources exchanged include economic goods, political support, loyalty, 
votes, and protection on the one hand, and promises of solidarity and loyalty on the other. 
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Thus, the diffuse nature of clientelism ties should be considered as part of the definition of 
clientelism in the context of Iraq.  
 Longevity   
The literature suggests that modern clientelism is characterised by short time spans such as 
material transactions offered some days before elections, offered to citizens in return for their 
votes (Schaffer, 2007; Nichter, 2008). But the literature also refers to the continuous nature of 
the relationship between patron and client. According to Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007: 8), 
politicians gain confidence in the viability of their transactions by iteration, or a gradual 
build-up of the relationship. Some modern clientelistic relationships are not necessarily 
inherited, but still some inherited elements may remain (Muno, 2010). This feature 
distinguishes clientelism from other exchange relations such as bribery, which are usually 
short-lived, where neither party has a strong desire to interact in the future. In Iraq, this long-
termness has an important implication for clientelism in that the exchange is based on public 
sector jobs which are usually characterised by longevity.   
Obligatoriness    
Clientelistic relations are generally seen as voluntary. At any rate, the connection between 
patron and client can officially be abandoned voluntarily (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1980: 50). 
But what makes the clientelistic relationship continue for a long time if it is voluntary? 
According to Muno (2010) this is because ending such clientelistic connections, like other 
connections, entails certain costs. The question is whether such costs would be high enough 
to deprive ‘voluntary’ of any recognisable meaning (Hicken, 2011). According to Stokes 
(2007: 608-609), there may be fear of retaliation if the connection is severed. Perhaps both 
sides would have to pay some costs for exiting such connections: from the client side, they 
may lose their benefits such as jobs; from the patron side the cost may be loss of credibility -   
they may not be trustworthy anymore and could not mobilise their clients in case of need 
(Muno, 2010). So, one can argue that because of such costs, both clients and patrons may 
have to comply with clientelistic connections: the relationship is no longer voluntary but to 
all intents and purposes obligatory.   
In the past, under the regime of Saddam Hussein, patronage was based on one-party rule and 
a long-standing relationship of domination by one family and loyalty to one political party in 
power - the Ba’athist party. This form of centralised patronage was authoritarian, in which 
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the relationship endured by threat and coercion. Clientelism was used as a tool of social 
control throughout the rule of the Ba’athist party between 1968 and 2003, and was therefore 
more obligatory than voluntary. But today, this kind of coercion no longer exists in Iraq, and 
instead, clientelism is operating in a wider way than the past because, ironically, it has 
become democratised based on muhasassa. This system still involves monitoring clients’ 
behaviour by different groups in power during election times, to force client to carry out their 
commitments. But political parties do not have such power as Saddam Hussein had to compel 
clients to stick to their commitments. In many cases, clients have lost their jobs when they 
have voted for other parties, but they are not forced to leave Iraq, as under Saddam’s regime. 
Nevertheless, it would be hard to consider such clientelism under the muhasassa system as 
totally voluntary: clientelism based on muhasassa is not completely free from force, and the 
voluntary element is not absolute. 
Collective/dyadic   
A dyadic exchange of particularistic favours between two individuals is the traditional sense 
of patron-client relationship, whereas the modern version broadens the exchange to include 
collective exchanges (Montambeault, 2012: 99-101). The dyadic element lies in the fact that 
clients have to work for, or give solidarity and support to, patrons in exchange for the 
provision of goods, services and jobs (Muno, 2010). Landé (1983: 443) held that dyadic 
relationships are sometimes elusive, in that the relationship is usually informal, and not 
subject to record.  By contrast, when allegiance is expressed by clients towards a political 
party and state actors, it has a collective rather than dyadic character. In recent literature, the 
central debate revolves around whether the clientelistic ties in a muhasassa system such as 
Iraq are dyadic or collective. In fact, they are both: both dyadic and collective ties can exist in 
muhasassa and partisan forms of clientelism. Dyadic exchanges involve personal one-to-one 
connections with politicians who aim to be elected and re-elected, and citizens who are 
involved in bargaining for accessing public privileges. Collective exchanges are involved 
when political leaders use the popularity of the party platform to garner support within 
organisations such as tribes, and NGOs, by giving them economic incentives and exploiting 
their affiliations at times of elections. Thus, in the case of Iraq we need to add collective 
bargaining to individual bargaining where groups of actors trade allegiance in return for 
benefit from access to the public resources.  
Reciprocity    
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The fifth feature of clientelism in Iraq is reciprocity. According to Stokes (2007: 605), a 
clientelistic tie is a quid pro quo or reciprocal relationship in which the client complies by 
providing political support to the patron. Muno, (2010) argues that clients have to work for, 
or give solidarity and support to, patrons in exchange for the provision of goods, services and 
jobs.  
To sum up, the above discussion shows that the definition of clientelism centres on the 
trading of state funds by political parties in return for political support. In the case of Iraq, 
such buying of affiliation is characterised by a clientelistic relationship containing five 
features -diffuseness, longevity, obligatoriness, dyadic/collective, and reciprocity – and this 
identifies the core concept of clientelism in Iraq. The next section shows where we can find 
these five characteristics of clientelism in Iraq.   
Patterns of clientelistic ties in Iraq   
The aim of this section is to explain the many ways in which clientelism operates in Iraq and 
to investigate why this kind of clientelism occurs there, and why it can be considered as 
clientelism on our definition. The discussion is based on the perceptions of clientelism 
expressed by elite interviewees and focus group members during fieldwork conducted in 
2014-2015. The findings presented here reveal two kinds of clientelistic exchanges: first is 
the buying of affiliation at the individual level; second is buying the support of groups rather 
than individuals. 
Buying individual political affiliations   
Data show that politicians are involved in clientelism at the individual level in the following 
three ways: public appointments; ghost jobs; and short-term perks and retirement pensions.   
Public appointments  
The distribution of public sector jobs in Iraq through clientelism has taken a new form, totally 
different from the past as a result of the sectarian government. It was confidently predicted 
that the post-2003 political transformations and elections in Iraq would bring a replacement 
of the particularistic relationships such as the patronage network in the former Iraqi regime 
(Le Billon, 2005) by a new state-citizens relationship based on merit in selecting people for 
public sector jobs. However, the sectarian and partisan form of government led to political 
7 
 
leaders violating the principle of equal access to state employment,  and inequality in 
obtaining state jobs persisted.   
 A former Kurdish MP in the Iraqi parliament said:   
“… the former prime minster [Nuri al-Maliki] when he submitted the 
budget that comes from the government, put too much money into the 
Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Interior - more than what 
should be [needed] for the security sector. For instance, within that 
security sector there are 10,000 employees and the standard for 
employing those people is not loyalty to the government but loyalty to 
a particular sect, a particular religion, a particular component, a 
particular party and within that party to a particular leader. These 
10,000 security people are purely those people who are loyal to his 
party”.  
As a current Kurdish MP in the Iraqi parliament said of  Prime Minister  Maliki,  “He 
obtained millions of votes at the last election because before the election he... employed many 
people in his party i.e. 10,000 in defence and interior ministries”.   
Giving public sector jobs is also a way to build relationships more broadly between citizens 
and parties whereby parties can control society. As a Kurdish independent commentator said, 
“spending the public budget in political ways... buys loyalty...  in Iraq, more than five million 
people have taken salaries from different government departments. The main aim of these 
employees is to capture people or to calm down people from rebelling against elites in 
power”.  So the budget fuels fiefdoms owned by various sectarian and partisan leaders who 
use it for political purposes. The power of the political parties has become a channel to divert 
public resources to sectarian ends.    
A current Kurdish MP in the Iraqi parliament said that clients endeavour to improve their 
lives by obtaining public sector jobs through being affiliated to political parties in power. He 
notes that “the public employment in Iraq is now more than 15% of whole of the population”. 
The problem is that, as argued by a NGO member in Baghdad, many of these appointees are 
unqualified for public office because they lack the minimum requirements of education and 
experience for such positions. 
Although such clientelistic arrangements seem to be voluntary in that they are not necessarily 
the result of exploitation and manipulation, if somebody is appointed by a political party they 
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have to vote for the party who has given them the job, otherwise they lose their job. This has 
been observed in the security and police sectors over the last few years. As a member of the 
NGO’s focus group discussion said, “I know many people were working in the police and 
security forces who did not vote their political parties in power, but they lost their jobs”. 
According to an official in the Kurdistan region, “their life depends on the resources parties 
are provided for them so they have to be committed to the parties’ politics”. A former official 
in Kurdistan government who now leads a personnel consultancy company, said “the parties 
in power threaten people by saying: you have to be aware that I provide your salaries; if you 
do something unpleasant towards the party, I will cut your salary”.   
 This shows how clientelism in Iraq is not really voluntary, by contrast to the literature which 
highlights the voluntary feature of clientelism (Muno, 2010 and Hicken, 2011). In Iraq, such 
reciprocity contains an obligatory connection between two parties. Monitoring by parties’ 
organisations to ensure that clients comply with the parties’ strategy in election time or else 
they will lose their salaries, makes clientelism more of a dyadic relationship or one-to-one 
connection than a collective one. Moreover, as long as the exchange is based on public jobs, 
it can be described as a longevity connection between two parties. All this indicates that such 
exchange relationships cover the five features of clientelism. 
One reason for the perpetuation of this clientelistic system of job allocations is that, as the 
journalist focus group discussion made clear, without a connection with a political party, 
citizens would find it difficult to obtain jobs. A current Kurdish MP in the Iraqi parliament 
argued that party linkage is a precondition for being given public sector jobs, and there is 
little prospect of obtaining jobs in the private sector. Iraq had long been a rentier and socialist 
country, where the private sector was small and so the public sector was the only choice for 
employment. A senior Iraqi official, said, “these huge levels of employment in the public 
sector are not recent to Iraq... the private sector did not exist before 2003 and we do not have 
a very strong private sector to employ people there”. Likewise, a member of the journalist 
focus group said that:   
“Iraq was a socialist system till the overthrow of Saddam.... after 
2003 in Iraq we do not know whether Iraq has adopted socialism or 
capitalism…and we live under the old socialism rules in which all 
things are run by the government such as health, education... and the 
private sector is not involved in running any of these sectors. 
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Therefore, all people try to find opportunities and work in the public 
sector”.   
The main reason for the continuation of clientelism in Iraq after 2003 is the development of 
the system of muhasassa in Iraqi politics, ministries and institutions, which was inextricably 
linked to sectarian quotas. As a former Sunni MP said, there was a huge increase in the 
number of political appointments in the Iraqi public sector because “al- muhasassa is a fertile 
ground for this employment.” An MP formerly on the Integrity Commission, said “that in 
Iraq the political parties coming into government hand out many positions from the cleaners 
up to the post of minister”. 
In the Kurdistan region, the system of political appointments is based only on party divisions, 
not ethno-sectarian divisions. A former MP from the Kurdistan parliament, claimed that, “In 
Kurdistan, there is no issue related to the ethno-sectarian division [the majority in Kurdistan 
are Kurdish speakers], but here there are divisions based on the political parties between the 
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK] and Party Democratic of Kurdistan [PDK]. In the past 
few years to buy votes in the general election the political parties did everything such as 
providing public sector jobs these all happen by both parties in power”.   
Ghost jobs  
Another aspect of sectarian and politically-oriented appointments, is jobs through ‘Ghosts’ 
(al-Fazhia in Arabic), a term which has recently become notorious in Iraq. In his first speech 
as Prime Minister in the Iraqi parliament, Haider al-Abadi said, ‘In four Iraqi army sections, 
which included 100,000 soldiers, 50,000 were unreal and called ghosts (al-Fazhia) (A 
current Kurdish MP in the Iraqi parliament). The term ‘ghost’ has two meanings: real and 
imaginary. The ‘real’ ghosts exist in the real world as people who draw salaries but do little 
or no work: the ‘imaginary’ ghosts do not exist in the real world but are fictitious names used  
to generate money for their inventors. For example, a former commissioner in Baghdad 
mentioned a case related to Mushan al-Jburi (a current Sunni MP): “he was in charge of an 
oil pipeline between Kirkuk and Turkey for a few years in post 2003. Al-Jburi was 
responsible for protecting the oil pipeline but he listed 14,000  soldiers and he took the 
regular salaries of 14,000  soldiers, however, practically, there were only 3,000 soldiers 
there”.   
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Typically, ‘real ghosts’ are people on the army payroll who draw salaries but do not take part 
in any military action. Former Prime Minister Maliki built what is called al-Isnad 
(supporters) for the Iraqi military forces, but these supporters often sat at home, costing 
500,000 Iraqi dinars (roughly equivalent to US$450) each per month. General David Petraeus 
(then head of the US General Forces in Iraq) launched an initiative to face al-Qaida called al-
Sahwa (awakening), but commenting on this initiative, a former commissioner at Baghdad 
said that “¾ of the al-Sahwa army were found to be ‘troops in the sky’ in Iraqi terms;’ i.e. 
‘ghosts’. An investigation by the Chief of the Armed Forces found that US$14 million was 
spent each year on ‘real’ ghosts”. 
Ghosts are not confined to the defence sector:  according to a current Kurdish MP in the Iraqi 
parliament “the number of ghosts in the interior ministry are 75,000 and in the municipality 
of Basra there are 5,000 ghosts and in the municipality of Baghdad many ghosts were 
disclosed. During four months of investigation more than 120,000 ghosts have been found in 
different Iraqi institutions”. Ghosts also exist in the Kurdistan region, as a high commissioner 
in the Kurdistan region said: “in Kurdistan there is talk of 100,000 people in one day going to 
their office in order to take their salaries and after that they do not go to work at all... Some 
talks of about 50,000 and some 100,000 and some talk of around 200,000”. In the last few 
years, some politicians have obtained many votes through providing ghost jobs even in areas 
where such politicians are not popular. For example, the former prime minister personally 
benefitted to the tune of millions of votes.  
Such allocations through ghost jobs may not cover all the five features of clientelism found in 
the literature. For example, ghost jobs lack the one-to-one connection of clientelism, because 
although we know one side of the bargain (the patron), the other side (the ghosts or clients) 
are hard to identify and may be  fictitious. It is also true that ghost jobs may mean little more 
than material goods rather than being an exchange relationship for political purposes which is 
mainly what clientelism is about. Such connection through ghosts can be classified as a form 
of buying of groups of loyalties because it is characterised also by collective relationship i.e. 
groups connection with the parties. Nevertheless, this kind of relationship exchange can be 
labelled as clientelism because it manifests all the other features - diffuseness, longevity, 
obligatoriness, y, and reciprocity between two parties.   
The negative impact of ghost jobs is severe. Not only is it a gross waste of public resources, it 
can undermine the effectiveness of military security. For example, in August 2014, part of 
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Iraq was occupied by ISS, and as a Kurdish MP in the Iraqi parliament said, “investigating 
the reasons behind the collapse of the Iraqi army, ghosts had a huge impact on lowering the 
capacity over 2-3 days of the Iraqi military force regarding large ISS controlled areas”. On 
the other hand, some respondents, including an Iraqi high commissioner, have claimed that 
the ghost issue could be seen as a means of “reconciliation between Shia and Sunni 
communities” because it encourages al-Isnad (supporters) and al-Sahwa (awakening) from 
Sunni tribes to feel secure enough to become a part of the Iraqi forces in fighting al-Qaida.  
Short-term perks    
In addition to these public appointments and ghost jobs, there are short-term perks such as   
gifts of money or meals before elections. As long as sectarian affiliations exist, individuals 
vote for their parties who are from either Shia, Sunni and Kurds dominated areas. However, 
because of multiple political groups in each area, there are divisions and subdivisions within 
each sectarian group. As a former Kurdish MP in the Iraqi parliament stated that “there are 
many rival groups within a single ethnic or religious background. For example, within the 
Shia there are many political groups and this is also true for Sunni and Kurds; it is hard to 
say that one single political party can reflect the reality of one component”. In this situation, 
although ethnic and religious affiliation or identity is manipulated by the political elites 
(Eifert et al., 2010), voters support different candidates within their ethnic or religious group 
who are from their own communities - what is called in Arabic ibn al billad (son of the 
community) - and they may choose candidates who deliver services to their narrow local 
community (Lust, 2009: 127). So citizens not only support ethnic or religious sect parties, but 
they prefer candidates within those parties who are affiliated to their family or tribes, or who 
provide some immediate gifts. For example, in poor areas, the political parties provide 
transportation, entertainment, meals, clothes, and cash and make recommendations to the 
voters about how to use their ballots (Fieldwork notes, 2014-2015). Another former Kurdish 
MP in the Iraqi parliament reported some candidates before an election “providing fried 
chicken”. A former senior official (now retired) in the Kurdistan region referred to “[political 
parties in power] giving cash [to voters] some days before elections”. Personally, I observed 
this in the region many times. This kind of inducement to vote for an ethnic segment of a 
political party was encouraged by the changes in the electoral rules in 2005 and 2013 
allowing voters to choose between different candidates within a political party. Because it is 
not long-term, this type of the exchange may seem simply vote-buying, but some writers have  
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asserted  that vote-buying is a durable relationship between two sides and helps politicians, in 
particular, in oil rich countries, to stay in power (Andersen and Aslaksen, 2013), and 
therefore is a kind of clientelism (Vicente and Wantchekon , 2009).  
The fact that short-term perks are distributed by many parties’ organisations in a variety of 
forms (including goods, services, and cash) during days before and after elections (my 
fieldwork notes 2014-2015), indicates the diffuseness of this clientelistic transaction. Brokers 
monitor voters’ behaviour, and clients may be afraid that if they fail to honour their electoral 
commitments, parties in power may ask for the return of the gifts that they took before 
elections. This illustrates the embedded reciprocity exchange in clientelism. However, the 
short-term perk lacks the collective/dyadic feature connection of clientelism, and so it could 
be labelled not purely, but significantly, clientelism.   
Retirement pensions     
The fourth kind of individualistic clientelism in Iraq involves retirement pensions. 
Clientelistic retirement pensions take three different forms. The first form is people who 
obtain high rank retirement pensions. For example, a Kurdish MP in the Iraqi parliament 
explained that “in Kurdistan there are 1,026 people with the rank of retired minister, vice 
minister or general director, even though there have only been six successive cabinets. The 
number of ministers receiving retirement pensions exceeds the total number of members of 
these cabinets, and inside this list there are retired people with the rank of ministers who 
have never held the position of ministers at all”. Another MP in the Kurdistan parliament 
reports “404 retired women with high military ranks, none of whom has been involved in 
military service”. According to a former commissioner in Baghdad “people may be employed 
for 1-5 days and then retire, based on their affiliation to a specific political party.”   
Such rewards may make the retired people renew and continue their loyalties to the parties, 
and this why we define such retirement pensions as clientelism - because the purpose of the 
pension, according to a Kurdish independent commentator, is “continuing in their support of 
the parties in power”, thereby embedding a longevity relationship between parties and their 
members. Through such retirement pensions, parties can secure their clients’ commitments to 
the parties’ interests until the very end of their lives. Such connection can be marked by 
reciprocity as well, and there may be a dyadic connection between retired people with 
political leaders, if they are both from the same sect or the same political party. The 
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relationship may not be directly face-to-face, but the retired people may have a strong 
connection based on respect and meeting leaders’ demands when necessary. Hence, such 
retired links based on secure loyalties are closer to clientelism than any other connection.    
From the four instances of individualistic clientelism identified above, we can conclude 
several points:  
First, individualistic clientelism could be considered a means of involving more people in 
politics and raising their awareness of public policy, because in a variety of ways, many 
people have  become incorporated into the political system, though this is not to say that all 
citizens are now meaningfully integrated within this clientelistic  system.   
Second, individualistic clientelism can be considered as a means of re-distributing state 
resources, since, as an MP from a prominent party in power in the Kurdistan parliament, said, 
“People do not have opportunities to work and there are young graduates with no job 
options. The private sector is not so strong here.” Although the receivers must obey the 
providers, this does not necessarily mean slavery (Muno, 2010). Indeed, it could be argued 
that clientelism can bring in to the political system many marginalised people who are 
excluded from the benefit of state resources. Moreover, such clientelism could be seen as a 
means of preventing people from engaging in the violence that sometimes erupts when they 
feel deprived of the benefits of public resources.   
However, third, my view is that, regardless of these benefits, individualistic clientelism has 
been very harmful to the way democracy has functioned in Iraq, undermining accountability. 
Sectarian political parties capturing citizens by using public wealth to buy political 
affiliations that benefit the parties in power, undermine the principle of democratic decision-
making. Such huge manipulation of public appointments by parties means the repression of 
critical voices on corrupt state decisions. As a Kurdish independent commentator said “If 
people take jobs based on buying affiliations … this is blunting their criticism of the 
government”. Another official in the Kurdistan region raised the danger of ending up like 
Gulf countries which “lack space for criticism” and the rulers stay in power for a long time. 
This has produced over the last decades what is called freakery in Arabic or “Al-Fahula”, 
where “one voice controls the others” (NGOs focus group’s discussion, also confirmed by a 
Kurdish MP in the Iraqi parliament), whereby the entire society becomes attached to the 
parties in power. Instead of voting being a means of holding politicians to account, it 
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becomes a means whereby politicians hold citizens to account for their pledge of electoral 
commitment to the party. Such clientelism allows some politicians to survive in power until 
they die.    
Fourth, the question may be raised whether such individualistic clientelism is corrupt when it 
is not illegal. The reason why individualistic clientelism is corrupt is because it is formed to 
promote mutual benefit between two parties at the expense of public funds (Kawata, 2006: 
12-14). In other words, people who are involved in a clientelistic exchange relationship gain a 
mutual benefit which is private, and this means privatising the public interest for a particular 
segment of the community. As Hutchcroft (1997) put it, individualistic clientelism is 
‘particularistic advantage’ and the implication is that this clientelism relationship will harm 
the public interest, and is therefore corrupt, whether or not it is legal.   
Fifth, individualistic clientelism results in a waste of public resources, because it creates a 
situation of over-employment and inequality in accessing state resources, and of unqualified 
people in the bureaucracy. Furthermore, it undermines the capacity of the government to 
allocate capital for investment. As a current Kurdish MP at the Iraqi parliament, noted: “In 
Iraq..., nearly 70% of the public budget went to operational aspects in the form of the 
salaries, and only 30% went to investment aspects, and Kurdistan was the same in this 
regard...This is because of the huge number of people employed in the public sector.”   
In summary, four kinds of benefits were exchanged for political support: public sector jobs 
and retirement pensions are full-blooded clientelism; whereas ghost jobs and short-term perks 
are partially clientelistic. In the next section, we discuss clientelism that occurs at the 
organisational level, including buying the support of groups rather than individuals.   
Buying the support of organisations    
Besides buying the political affiliation of individual people, there are forms of political 
exchange in Iraq that involve buying the support of groups rather than individuals, and the 
use of a wider range of inducements than jobs and welfare benefits. The three subsections 
below draw primarily upon views expressed by interviewees and focus group discussants   
during 2014-2015, supplemented by my observations and reflections in the field.    
Buying support from NGOs  
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The importance of NGOs for the parties in power is that NGOs can provide both short-term 
and long-term support. NGOs represent a new organ for political parties, and parties can 
capture them through offering funding. A member of the NGOs focus group, raised the issue 
of funding and said, that “between 80 and 90% of the NGOs are part of the parties in power, 
since  without financial support from the parties in power,  these NGOs cannot afford to pay 
the rents of their offices.” Funding opens up the prospect of long-term and sustainable 
connections between NGOs and parties in power, and long-term connection is a feature of 
clientelism. The importance of funding to NGOs is that it is the only way whereby they can 
survive to carry out their everyday tasks.   
Unlike NGOs in other countries, NGOs in Iraq have little desire to regard themselves as 
independent of political parties. This is clearly observable in many Iraqi elections and rallies 
where NGOs publicly support  their sponsoring parties. The NGOs focus group argued that 
all of them [NGOs] live by funds from the PUK and PDK parties in the Kurdistan region. 
Indeed, a considerable amount of NGOs’ time and energy was allocated to make connections 
with the right political actors at state level or leaders of political parties because this 
connection secures their funding. A Kurdish independent economic commentator in the 
Kurdistan region said that it is common practice for officials or figures from political parties 
to become heads of the NGOs:  
 “The parties put their members in the top positions of these 
organisations … these organisations are partially or fully a part of 
the party - for instance, organisations for students- because parties 
finance these organisations and at the end these organisations cannot 
do anything against the government. There is no organisation in this 
county without political and financial links with parties. These 
organisations become a semi-public sector. Instead of expressing 
their own independent voices and interests... for monitoring the 
government’s public policies, they are already a part of the political 
parties in power. The parties often finance organisations in their 
programme and organisations support government. How could such 
organisations speak against the government? In this country almost 
all NGOs are run by political leaders. These organisations should 
demonstrate the reality of the society, in contrary; they tend to cover 
these realties. They take money and they are member of the parties in 
power and they can do nothing against parties in the government”.   
NGOs have become very effective channels through which parties can gather support and 
solidarity at the national and local levels, because they have members on the ground who can 
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look for votes, alliance, and support. Also, NGOs can monitor their members’ voting 
behaviour, and if members do not follow the NGO’s collective decision, they are sacked from 
their jobs. Two such cases were revealed by a member of the NGOs focus groups: one of the 
cases related to himself and the other related to his friend. This indicates the obligatoriness of 
the reciprocity exchange between parties and NGOs. The great value to NGOs of their 
affiliation to political parties is not only the securing of funds, but also their enhanced status 
in the eyes of the elites.   
However, this does not necessarily mean that all NGOs in Iraq are subject to this connection. 
For one thing, the study covers only part of Iraq (the area of the fieldwork) and may not be 
representative of the whole country. For another thing, some NGOs have independent 
political, social and economic purposes and have some NGO members who are politically 
unbiased in their decisions during the time of elections.  
Buying support from small parties  
Another organisational level connection is with smaller political parties. As one interviewee, 
who was an MP from a party in power for many years in the Kurdistan region, said, “Buying 
loyalty is not only related to ordinary people, but also the big political parties buying the 
smaller ones”. This kind of relationship indicates that a new form of political exchange has 
been established. A journalist in the journalists’ focus group discussion who had personally 
investigated this issue, reported his findings thus:     
  “.... I published a document in which the Minister of Finance from 
the PUK party clearly stated that: ‘we decided to increase the budget 
of the five political parties’; the formal letter was sent to the high 
office of the PUK party. So I published this document, and everyone 
understands that all small parties take the money directly from the 
PUK [in Kurdistan]. But they actually got the money from the 
Finance Minister [public money]. So the process is like this: the 
Minister of Finance gives money to the high office of the PUK party. 
It is difficult to identify what they meant by small parties, but I got the 
impression that it includes parties from different minorities or from 
other groups who have got only one or two seats in the parliament, 
and they talked about the small parties in the Kurdistan region rather 
than in the whole of Iraq, and from there the small parties take the 
money. So the small parties understand that the money is given by the 
bigger parties, so they have more commitment with the PUK/PDK 
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parties’ policies. This is the process of buying small political 
parties”.   
Offering public money to small parties is intended to encourage small parties to form 
alliances with the political parties in power. Political parties in power make it clear that 
offering such funds is contingent on obtaining political support, thereby putting small parties 
in a place where they would not rebel against them. Such a connection also prevents small 
parties working together to achieve effective representation. This is an example of clientelism 
in that the purpose of the fund is to build reciprocity which enables parties in power to 
maintain the status quo.   
For the small parties, the main advantage of these deals with the major parties is obtaining 
money. This has led to their description as ‘political shops’ by a member of the NGOs focus 
group, who said, “currently we call these small political parties political shops”. Just as there 
are retail shops doing commercial business, so there are political shops that do political 
business. However, interviewees and focus groups did not provide many details about this 
exchange relationship, and there were disagreements between them over what was being 
exchanged and for what purpose. Nevertheless, based on their testimonies we can draw two 
conclusions. First, buying affiliation here is not related to the buying of votes of members 
from small parties in parliamentary elections, but rather to the buying of votes of members of 
small parties in parliament, because when they get to the parliament the smaller parties have 
to support their sponsor’s parties. A journalist in the journalist focus group elaborated this 
point thus:    
“Some small parties from different minorities in the region obtain one 
or two seats in the Kurdistan parliament but they join up with the big 
parties. There do not have independent opinions about the issues but 
they are often meeting with the PDK MPs. Based on that, we called 
them the special force. MPs from PDK frankly told us that we are 37 
MPs but with the special force we become 48 MPs: when they come 
to the negotiation and vote for a particular law, they told us we are 
48 MPs”.   
This process indicates that buying the affiliation of the small political parties is a form of 
collective bargaining between parties in power and small parties. As long as the small parties 
honour their commitments to their sponsors (parties in power), the reciprocity exchange can 
be relatively long-lasting and collective, all features of clientelism. Second, this process 
indicates that building genuine opposition parties will be difficult. There can be no hope for 
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building political watchdogs in the country when not only NGOs but also small parties are so 
closely linked with the political parties in power.   
 Buying the support of families and tribal affiliations   
Another organisational level link is related to buying the support of leading religious families. 
Here the influence of political parties in power may be discerned operating more widely in 
Iraqi society, extending to the country’s traditional tribal and religious family systems. 
Despite many changes in the structure of Iraqi society because of modernisation, the mental 
and spiritual make-up of many people has not fundamentally changed. Inducements from a 
political party to the elders in traditional tribal family groups may be sufficient to persuade all 
the group’s members to give their support to the sponsoring party. There are three types of 
families: famous families; martyrs’ families; and poor families.  
On famous families, the most effective mechanism for capturing famous families is to 
provide them with funding support from the political parties in power. An example of this 
practice was provided by a member of the NGOs focus group, who argued that in Kurdistan, 
the misappropriation of public resources is done in a systematic way to support members of 
well-known families: “we do have a specific type of family who receive regular funds from 
the government or from the political parties in power.”  
This form of exchange is based on a promise by the head of the families, and 
recommendations by elders are apparently effective due to their frequent interactions with 
their local community. This kind of exchange relationship is not only iterated over a long 
period of time, but also collectively backed by strong grassroots support of people from 
tribes, and is therefore consistent with the notion of clientelism. It seems that this kind of 
exchange between parties in power with some elder’s families is  far more effective  for the 
parties as social multipliers in generating core party support than those generated through 
one-to-one connection, i.e. jobs. However, such connection cannot be classified as fully 
reciprocal because parties cannot impose any kind of punishment on broader members of 
families for lack of commitment to the parties’ candidates in time of elections.  
On martyr families, a senior advisor in the Kurdistan region government affirmed that “We… 
built many houses for the families of martyrs in different areas in the Kurdistan region, again 
with oil money.” The government, in order to make martyrs’ families happy and compensate 
them, reward them with a wide range of privileges. Although each government has its own 
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ways of providing such compensation, in Iraq it includes houses, salaries, land, and 
scholarships. Such compensation keeps these martyrs’ families within the parties’ core 
supporters. My evidence over the last two elections in the Kurdistan region indicates that one 
opposition party (Goran Party) has increased its votes significantly in areas where many 
martyr’s families live. However, some martyrs’ families complained to the media that they 
were neglected by the parties in power.  
This form of compensation seems acceptable in Iraqi society because these families in the 
eyes of the people deserve help due to their greater sacrifices in the last decades of wars in 
Iraq. However, a former MP from the Integrity Committee in Kurdistan parliament described 
the corrupt self-interest entailed in such allocations of public resources: “…the politicians 
built around one thousand houses for martyrs’ families from oil money. Indeed, they did not 
do this formally as a government service for such family, but the house was considered a gift 
from the party to such family in order to buy their family’s loyalty.”   
Another targeted demographic is providing help to poor families, though there is a problem 
of how this allocation worked. According to a journalist investigator in the journalist’s focus 
group discussion, there were questions about whether these benefits ever reached poor 
families, because the money was distributed via the offices of political parties:   
“…when the budget of 2013 was set up, there were tables for the 
allocation of the budget and a bit of explaining about the spending. 
There was money allocated for poor families as a social benefit and I 
personally investigated this money and found that the government 
money has been distributed in the departments of the political party 
building. It turned out that members from the political party take lots 
of money and distribute it to the poor families. As far as I know about 
this issue, this is a kind of deceit...., I went to the General Director of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs, and I said why you are distributing 
money at the political party’s branch. He frankly replied that the high 
official at the top had asked me to do so”.  
From the above account of instances of connections between parties and organisations or 
groups, four points can be concluded:   
First, by contrast to the one-to-one interactions of individual clientelism, organisational 
clientelism is characterised by diffuseness, in which a wider range of inducements than jobs 
and welfare benefits are used. Moreover, the funds and rewards given to the organisations by 
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political parties are given not so much to pressurise NGOs or other organisations into 
adopting a particular voting preference, but rather to persuade as many people as possible to 
support the political parties in power (Warner, 1997: 537). This indicates that such exchanges 
are marked by collective bargaining that involves buying the support of whole groups rather 
than particular individuals.  Establishing such relationships with NGOs and other 
organisations can also be marked by longevity in that the commitments seem to be long-term.  
This makes the exchange relationship cover most features of clientelism.  
Second, this kind of clientelism with organisations provides opportunities for members inside 
these organisations, who previously spent most of their life enduring dictator regimes, wars 
and conflicts in Iraq, to engage in the process of learning skills in running civil society. Such 
contributions helped to educate them in participation, co-operation, and familiarity with the 
state’s laws and policies. Third, however, these clientelistic activities may compromise the 
political neutrality of NGOs, and change the NGOs and other organisations (e.g. famous 
families or small parties) from non-partisan to partisan activism.  
Fourth, the diversion of public revenue to the large political parties and then to other small 
parties could be considered the looting of public money, hugely costly to society as a whole. 
Moreover, it is an obstacle when it comes to building efficient opposition parties or active 
civil society, because it prevents political leaders from facing any basic challenge to the 
expansion of their power. NGOs are supposed to be the key organisations to defend the 
interests of the citizens against arbitrary state actions,  but in the Iraqi situation, there can be 
no hope for building independent organisations when NGOs and other organisations are so 
closely linked to the political parties in power. As the journalists in the focus group 
discussion argued, “If NGOs take money from the governed thereby blunting their criticism of 
the government...This is a process of vicious circle”. This process makes building genuinely 
independent NGOs or opposition parties difficult: there can be no hope for political 
watchdogs in the country when not only NGOs but also small parties and tribes are so closely 
linked with the political parties in power. As a journalist in the focus groups said, this “not 
only makes NGOs stay silent but also give full praise to the government”.   
Conclusion  
Four main conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the study has shown that 
clientelism in Iraq is best understood as emerging from the trading of money for political 
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support - ‘buying affiliations and buying votes’.  Such clientelistic relationships in Iraq were 
characterised by five features:  diffuseness, longevity, obligatoriness, dyadic/collective, and 
reciprocity.   
Second, this paper has examined whether the data obtained from fieldwork provided evidence 
of clientelism in Iraq. The findings of the paper include the fact that at the individual level, 
clientelism is manifested in offering public sector jobs, ghost jobs, short – term perks, and 
retirement pensions. The paper then showed  how each  of these categories operated, 
demonstrating that although the  ties may not cover all five features of clientelism,  as long as 
they cover the main purpose of cliientelism -  i.e. trading money for buying political support - 
with some of the significant features of clientelism, they can be classified as clientelism. 
Clientelism at the individual level entails parties targeting individuals through mainly one-to-
one interactions, whereas at the organisational level, clientelism is manifested in buying the 
affiliation of groups, marked by collective bargaining. The latter includes buying the support 
of NGOs, small parties and famous, religious, and poor families, all of which are 
characterised by diffuseness, using a wider range of inducements than jobs and welfare 
benefits.   
Third, today clientelism in Iraq is more diffuse than the centralised patronage version during 
the time of Saddam, in that currently clientelism by political parties in Iraq is operating 
through the muhasassa system. Also, the version of clientelism current today in Iraq is more 
fragmented in the sense that through the muhasassa many political parties have greater access 
to state resources. Clientelistic ties in Iraq are partly caused by the insecurity of the economic 
and political situation that has plagued Iraq over the last decades, in that people build 
loyalties with political leaders to improve their economic life. Clientelism through the 
muhasassa system in Iraq may also be considered a reasonable method for creating order and 
stability in an otherwise unpredictable environment, characterised by deprivation and 
insecurity. Thus, this paper suggests that clientelism (through muhasassa) may have some 
positive value. In the literature, clientelism has almost entirely negative connotations, but the 
paper has argued that clientelism is for some people a rational response to the economic and 
political landscape facing them. Also, it could be argued that clientelism is a way of 
redistributing state resources that widens public access to these resources; that it involves 
more people in politics; and that it leads citizens to learn about democratic skills, cooperation 
and familiarity with public policies and laws.   
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However, this is not to say that clientelism is a good alternative to democratic processes in 
Iraq, since only a minority benefit from it. It is more convincing to argue that the negative 
side of clientelism outweighs the above-mentioned positive effects. The paper shows that 
clientelism has exacerbated inequality in accessing state resources, and that people who are 
involved in clientelistic exchange relationships gain a mutual benefit which is private, and 
this means privatising public resources for the interest of a particular segment of the 
community. Also, clientelism hampers fair competition in accessing public resources, and in 
this situation merit, capacity, and professionalism cannot be developed. Finally, clientelism 
has stunted critical voices in the society by “calming down people”. Instead of voters holding 
to account their representatives, clientelism makes voters accountable to their representatives.    
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